Guiding Concept
Tatjana Tönsmeyer
Occupied Societies. Conceptual reflections on the history of experiences of everyday life under German occupation in the Second World War*.
Citation: Tatjana Tönsmeyer, Occupied Societies. Conceptual Reflections on the History of Experiences of Everyday Life under German Occupation in the Second World War [translated by Francis Ipgrave], in: Online Edition “Societies under German Occupation”, 28th June 2023. DOI: 10.57886/1
When the German Reich surrendered on 8 May 1945, it is estimated that 36.5 million people had died in Europe as a direct result of the war, more than half of whom, at least 19 million, were civilians, including the six million victims of the Shoah. The continent was literally in ruins; there were 25 million homeless people in the Soviet Union alone.1 Furthermore, millions of people had been pressed into forced labour to support the German war economy – in the Reich but as well in the occupied territories. Research speaks of 36 million unfree labour relations in the German-occupied territories, referring thereby to forced and slave labour as well as to labour relations based on compulsory labour. 2 Even those who survived and had been spared forced labour had, in many cases, experienced years of a catastrophic supply problems and an existential shortage of goods.3 What these figures don’t tell is that each individual survivor had a personal story to relate about the years of occupation - and these tales were almost all about the suffering and pain resulting from exploitation and persecution, violence, humiliation, fear and loss.
In view of the fact that the German occupation meant a profound, and not infrequently crisis-ridden incision into the daily lives of some 235 million people from Tromsø to Heraklion, and from Smolensk to Bordeaux, it is remarkable that occupation as a history of experience has found less resonance in research than the commemorative and cultural treatment of the Second World War, or the history of the institutional and political occupation structures, which often tend to focus on the German actors.4
To a large extent, this is down to the terms and concepts that structure the relevant research. This article, therefore, takes its starting point from common interpretations and shows that "resistance and collaboration" are to be understood, rather, as terms of social self-description while, in Holocaust research, the figure of the bystander isincreasingly reflected in view of the passivity inscribed in the term. Accordingly, new conceptual approaches are required for investigations into both the diversity and the impact of the experience of occupation, which affected all areas of daily life. Under occupation, all people in the occupied countries were fundamentally hierarchised according to the racist and utilitarian criteria of the German occupiers while, at the same time, previously existing social, ethnic, religious or political antagonisms persisted and new ones, triggered by the occupation, were added. Between 1939 and 1945, occupied societies were thus societies in which specific dynamics developed because their members were subjected to a wide range of enormous pressures, both socially and emotionally, but also with regard to gender structures and their horizons of orientation which, in many cases had become just as obscure as the consequences of their behaviour had become unforeseeable. For those forced to live under it, occupation imposed constraints on action but sometimes opened up certain possibilities as well. It should therefore be conceived of as a context of experience on its own, under the term "occupied societies", since it is associated with specific logics of behaviour and forms of action, including survival strategies, within the framework conditions of violence.
Early Attempts at Making Sense of Occupation: Resistance and Collaboration
As is proved by the commemorations surrounding the major anniversaries of the end of the war in Europe or the liberation of Auschwitz, just as much as by opinion polls, memories of the Second World War and the genocide have not faded, despite the amount of time that has since passed. On the contrary, these events continue to play an important role in the memory cultures of European countries, precisely because their identity is often based on the legacy of the Second World War.
The master narratives of the early post-war period celebrated the victory over the German Reich or fascism as a (self-)liberation; accordingly, armed forces, including the resistance, played a prominent role here.5 In the 1950s and 1960s, these narratives in many European countries underwent an integrative shaping as ever larger populations were included in an identity-forming narrative. In particular, where there was a lack of “uncontaminated” elites, the memory of resistance served to reconstruct national identity and unity, or, in the words of Pieter Lagrou, to restore the "legitimacy of the majority"6. Western and Eastern European narratives agreed that "the nation" - for example the "true" Poles, Czechs, French, Dutch - had resisted the occupiers.
This finding certainly has its particular national nuances and variants. In France, Charles de Gaulle emphasised his own role in the resistance as a central source of political legitimacy, so as to represent himself as the embodiment of republican citizenship, of the rejection of foreign influences and of a timeless Frenchness ("la France éternelle"). This detachment of the concept of resistance from the historical circumstances made its broad interpretation possible so that, through this, and by rehabilitating the person of Pétain, members of the Vichy regime could be credited with also having opposed the occupation within the scope of their possibilities, and could therefore also be integrated into an anti-left coalition. In the context of the Cold War, on the other hand, communist resistance was excluded from this narrative.7 Redefined in this way, the Résistance became the core of French post-war identity, a phenomenon described by Henry Rousso as "Résistancialisme".8
In Belgium, too, where the nature of the Belgian political community and nation was negotiated in the context of the memory of war and occupation, an inclusive narrative was quickly established which saw Belgium as a society of resistance - sustained by anonymous, disciplined patriots whose "quiet" (i.e. non-military) and at the core apolitical heroism had been demonstrated in the support for downed Allied pilots or in intelligence activities.9 The Dutch narrative, in turn, also made use of national-moral categories, which were shaped above all by the doyen of Dutch World War historiography, Louis de Jong, and his colleagues at the RIOD, the National Institute for War Documentation.10 In this, the Netherlands was portrayed as a small but "courageous and steadfast" country that was ready to resist, or carried out "internal resistance".11
Resistance was heroically exaggerated in the Soviet narrative of the Second World War. While victory was initially attributed primarily to the outstanding leadership qualities of "Generalissimo" Stalin, after his death the Soviet myth of victory and superiority was based on representations of the war as a joint effort and the outstanding accomplishment of the entire Soviet people.12 Recently, following the start of the war against Ukraine, these interpretations have once again been sharpened by Vladimir Putin in the justification narrative of the "denazification" of Ukraine.13 The Polish resistance narrative, on the other hand, finds its most striking incarnation in the memory of the Warsaw Uprising.14 Whilst, in Stalinist post-war Poland, the fact that the Red Army did not support this resistance against the German occupiers led by the Armia Krajowa resulted in the official suppression of its memory, the anti-communist opposition responded to later attempts to propagate it as a "people's uprising" by raising questions about the Soviet role in it. The occupation years, as a whole, entered the collective memory as the "Years of Death", and were also represented for a long time by Auschwitz, as a prominent site of Polish suffering, and memorialised through the narrative of the endangered and yet indomitable Polish nation.15
In Slovakia, too, an uprising, the so-called Slovak National Uprising, takes a central place in national remembrance. This is an example of how an inclusive expansion of the resistance narrative took place in the post-state socialist era: Since 1989, the narrative of the nation in resistance is no longer embodied only in the communist partisans fighting together with the Red Army, but also integrates national Slovak forces as well as Jewish and foreign fighters, thus demonstrating the nation’s membership in the European "family of nations". This enables an interpretation of the Slovak state which reduces it to its political elite, who are held to be solely responsible for Slovak participation in the Holocaust.16
It would be easy to mention further variants of this sort of memorialisation but, in all of them, and in each context of instrumentalization, the common finding is that these inclusive narratives of national resistance to the German occupiers were, and continue to be, central to identity-forming narratives in post-war Europe and that, in this, ever larger groups of the population were continuously incorporated. Within the context of the Cold War, this was accompanied in Western Europe by a tacit exclusion of communist and, in state-socialist Europe, bourgeois, national(istic) and Jewish resistance. From the 1970s, and particularly since 1989/90, these "patriotic" narratives began to be challenged, and were replaced by a "genocide memory", whose moral definitions arose from transnationally led debates about the past, conducted in the name of ethical-universal values.17
More recent Holocaust research will be discussed below. At this point, it should first be noted that narratives of resistance carry with them, as antipodes, the concept of "collaboration". As great as the appreciation of the resistance was, and with it the emphasis on the unity of the "true" nation, as much were post-war societies united in their rejection and condemnation of those whom they accused of having betrayed the unity of the nation by working together with the German occupiers as "collaborators"18.
This general finding, like the resistance narrative before it, also has variants in a European perspective. In the Soviet Union, any long-term contact with the German side, including that of forced labourers and prisoners of war, was suspected of being a form of collaboration and often resulted in arrest by the NKVD as well as legal proceedings and draconian punishments.19 In other countries, too, in the "heated phase" at the end of the war and in the immediate post-war period, the leaders of the "collaboration governments" were prosecuted as so-called quislings20 in retribution trials.21 It was also not uncommon for women to be accused of "horizontal collaboration", beaten and publicly humiliated by having their hair shorn.22 Convictions were sometimes accompanied by the confiscation of property, reductions in food rations, the denial of a "certificate of national reliability" or the removal of the right to vote on the basis of "unworthiness".23 In sum, it can be seen that, with the restoration of the "legitimacy of the majority", social and gender orders were (re)established.
The concept of collaboration proves to be a constructed one, even where it was used within the framework of procedures based by the rule of law.24 This is all the more true for Eastern Europe. Thus a large number of party members who had not been evacuated25, but had remained in the occupied territories, had to undergo an internal examination by local party offices in the liberated Soviet Union. Even if, as a result of personnel shortages, not all those who were considered to be incriminated lost their positions, they were still considered unreliable and were placed under increased surveillance. The local press had a further group in its sights: They contrasted male heroes with the weak and faithless women who had lost their honour in (sexual) contact with the German occupiers. Although submittals to the party organs from this period show that a large part of the population was well aware of the shades of grey between "betrayal" or "collaboration" and "loyalty"26, these nuances soon became lost in the myths of victory and superiority described above, and could no longer be articulated individually.
This was only possible in fiction, albeit in a rudimentary form. Konstantin Simonov, probably the best-known and most widely read Soviet war correspondent, has his heroine Sofia Leonidovna become worked up about a neighbour in the story of the same name: "It is understandable that she works [as a typist in the city administration, to be understood: where she had contacts with collaborators, T.T.], after all she has to feed the children, but why complain forever? [...] She always complains: 'It's terrible, I'm a former Komsomol member, and only my husband, he's a political leader, what will he think of me when he comes back [from the front]?'", only then to have Sofia categorically declare immediately afterwards: "If he's not a donkey, then he must be able to think that she had three children to feed, or else he shouldn't have retreated - one of the two."27 However, since the regime did not accept the care of children as justification for contact with the occupiers, the character who embodies pro-Soviet resistance in the novella (a young woman named Masha) reacts in a perturbed manner. Simonov protects the character of Sofia from rejection or condemnation by staging her as a reincarnation of Prince Bolkonsky from Leo Tolstoy's War and Peace, who falls in battle against Napoleon.28 Just as Bolkonsky saw the French as enemies and criminals, so did Sofia Leonidovna look upon the Germans. She therefore supports the resistance and, with her eyes wide open, undergoes arrest and torture in order to enable Masha to escape. Masha remains the positive Soviet heroine but, en passant,Simonov weaves in aspects of the everyday reality of those people who were unwilling to sacrifice their own lives. In this way, he opens small windows into what can be said without questioning the conviction of the political leadership that the loyalty of Soviet citizens belongs to the state, and not to their families - the figure of the neighbour remains negatively connoted.
It would go beyond the scope of this article to go through the construction mechanisms of what is commonly referred to as "collaboration" for each occupied country. What can be said, however, is that the concept of collaboration - beyond the variety of interactions between occupied and occupiers, which need to be examined more closely - marks the boundaries for those who can neither be integrated into the narrative of resistance nor tacitly excluded from it. Accordingly, the talk of collaboration also represents a creation of meaning with identity-building intentions: It separates an "us" from a "them" - the "us" of the many who resisted from the "them" of the few who became traitors (and thus had to answer to the courts). The concept of collaboration therefore does not aim to shed light on possibilities and opportunities for action under the specific conditions of occupation, but rather, as part of the narratives of the post-war period which create meaning and identity, it clouds the analysis of these. In other words: The terms "resistance" and "collaboration" are terms of social (self-)description. As such, they were not developed in order to enable an analytical contribution to the understanding of occupied societies, and they therefore also tend to obscure the perception of the diversity of interactions between occupied and occupiers, as well as the resulting behavioural options available to them in the reality of everyday life under occupation.
Impulses from recent Holocaust research
Recent Holocaust research provides helpful suggestions for the description of occupation societies, including Jewish populations. This has become almost impossible to overlook in recent years, especially with regard to Eastern Europe. However, it is evident that Holocaust research, long characterised by a perpetrator-victim dichotomy, is striving for a stronger contextualisation of the events of persecution within their particular social environment.
An early impulse for this came from Raul Hilberg and the concept of the bystander heused to refer to the multitude of actors beyond the immediate perpetrators and victims. The focal point of the bystander concept, as used by Raul Hilberg and earlier by Michael Marrus, is the question of the assistance provided to persecuted Jews. Accordingly, attention is focussed on the Allies, the neutral states or the Vatican.29 However, the term suffers from a conceptual narrowing which it has experiences in the context of Holocaust education through its moral charge.30
At the same time, the closer research came to the actual sites of mass murder and the more it became clear that the war and the Shoah could no longer be regarded as separate entities, the more it became apparent that people who belonged neither to the group of German perpetrators nor to the group of Jewish victims were present at the sites which were now being more closely examined. In his much-discussed book "Neighbours", Jan T. Gross demanded, emphatically, that these be included in the research to a greater extent.31 In the meantime, a number of studies have been published which show that occupation created constraints as well as new options for action for members of the local populations. These also included direct or indirect participation in the German project of murdering the Jews. Driven by the desire to enrich themselves on Jewish property, locals denounced hidden Jews and participated in downright hunts for them.32 Under the conditions of occupation and the violence it unleashed, long established local anti-Jewish or anti-Semitic stereotypes were re-activated33 in the form of persecution practices, with fatal consequences for the victims.
However, local populations were also involved when it came to ascriptions of identity, or their denial: In an effort not toappear Jewish to the occupiers, who were unfamiliar with the area, crosses were nailed to house doors or images of saints were placed in windows so as to clearly distinguish "Jews" from "non-Jews".34 Elsewhere, Ukrainian and Russian relatives of German-born family groups also found themselves categorised as "ethnic group members" (so-called Volksgruppenangehörige). In rural southern Ukraine, this could mean preferential treatment in the supply of seeds and agricultural equipment, but could also lead to the recruitment of males as militia, often used as auxiliary troops in mass shootings.35 As Omer Bartov points out, the virulence of autochthonous ethnic conflicts in many border regions of eastern and south-eastern Europe led to a further dynamization of the murder of the Jews set in motion by the German occupation.36
One of the central findings of recent Holocaust research is that, particularly in the so-called killing fields of Eastern Europe, members of local societies were present as "third parties" alongside German perpetrators and Jewish victims.37 They, however, were not passive spectators, as has been shown by recent research, which is also sensitive to gender history and focuses more on forms of agency beyond the immediate contexts of power and killing.38 In the vicinity of the execution sites, even those who were supposedly "only" watching often signalled to the victims that they could not count on help if they tried to escape.39
All in all, the impact of the experience of occupation and the often-existential impact of violence, but also that of hunger and lack of food, the tearing apart of families and social networks, and the loss of work or housing40, demanded that people behave and act in many everyday situations. Since occupation also opened up new possibilities for action, an understanding of these local actors as passive spectators, or as "victims by dint of having to watch", falls short. This is how Patrick Desbois sees the local population, about whom he writes: "These were people who saw what happened but could do nothing. Powerless people who still ask themselves whether they are guilty or innocent".41 It becomes apparent here that the concept of victimhood itself is subject to historical processes of change.42
It is therefore insufficient to describe the realities of occupation through the categories of the bystander or, as shown above, those of resistance and collaboration, since these do not cover the broad spectrum of the everyday actions of people who, especially in Eastern Europe, could themselves become victims at any time, but some of whom also became perpetrators. Rather, occupation must be conceptualised as a distinct context of experience, with its own specific forms of behaviour and strategies for survival within the framework conditions of violence.
According to Tony Judt, the Second World War was a "war of occupation"43. Recent estimates suggest that 235 million people across the continent were affected, living under German occupation during the war years, from northern Norway to Greece and from Russia to western France. Even though occupation took differing forms, and there were both military and civilian-administered, annexed and protectorate territories44, one of the characteristics of occupation is that it is always to be understood as a form of war-induced foreign rule45, accompanied by a disempowerment of statehood on the part of the occupied.46 Furthermore, occupation is usually, and therefore also in the Second World War, associated with the physical and/or regulative presence of the occupiers. As a result, a relational, non-static and asymmetrical relationship develops between the occupiers and the occupied societies. Members of societies are therefore often directly or indirectly "occupier-driven" in their actions and forms of behaviour.47 German historiography in particular, in which perpetrator research plays an important role, often writes occupation history as the history of German crimes. The survival strategies of the occupied, as observed in Poland, often take a subordinate place in comparison.48
This finding needs to be taken more fully into account, particularly since occupation, even if it had regional variations, essentially had major consequences for all dimensions of daily life. In addition to the experience of violence, these included the rapidly deteriorating supply situation, especially with regard to food, but also other daily necessities such as clothing, shoes or medicine, as well as electricity, gas or water. Not infrequently, hungry or starving rump families found themselves in (partially) destroyed dwellings which were often no longer connected to a functioning infrastructure. Increasingly compelled to carry out forced labour, and at the same time threatened with being sent to work in the Reich if they lost their jobs, women, children and the elderly in particular had to walk further and further distances, since public transport was limited, queue for increasingly longer hours for food, secure the procurement of rationing stamps and obtain certificates for a multitude of everyday needs at offices and German departments: from clothing cards and relocation permits to travel passes and registration cards which entitled the holder to buy a ticket for transportation.49 Many of the practices necessary to meet every day needs were criminalised by the occupiers, such as shopping on the black market or travelling without the appropriate papers.50
It is no question that, even under these circumstances, it did make a difference whether hunger was the result, for example, of deliberate German strategy, as in parts of Ukraine, the consequence of shipping restrictions and the rapid collapse of the local administration, as in Greece, or resulted from the collapse of economic cycles and extensive requisitions, as in France.51 Despite these obvious differences, however, there were also commonalities at the level of experience and practice, such as the experience of hunger itself, the dependence on the black market and barter, and the fear of being caught by the local police or German forces.52 In fact, especially when looking at the food supply, it becomes clear that, under occupation, all people in the occupied countries were essentially categorised and hierarchised according to the racist and utilitarian criteria of the German occupiers.53
In the same way, both differences and similarities can also be identified for many other dimensions of the everyday experience of German occupation in the Second World War. In this context, this article seeks to take up the Polish observation, as formulated, for example, by Robert Traba54, and to demonstrate that the behaviour of those under occupation was much more varied in its characteristics than previous interpretations, primarily aimed at making sense of the situation, have thus far suggested. Therefore, in order to address the everyday dimensions of action and experience55 of non-German actors in their interactions with the occupiers or the occupation, we propose the term “occupied society(ies)”.
What connects the concept of war society to that of occupied society is that both social formations were the result of social, cultural and political transformation processes of "peace" societies; from these transformation processes arose experiences of violence, forms of rule, social relations and social participation.56 However, while studies centred upon the concept of war society focus primarily on Germany (and England/ Great Britain), and essentially ask what enabled the respective society to wage war by focussing on agencies and measures of population mobilisation for the purpose of crisis management in the sense of meeting the war aims and maintaining war morale57, the concept of occupation society takes the establishment of a violent foreign rule as its starting point and inquires into the related dimensions of experience. To put it more pointedly: The concept of war society seeks to investigate interactions between the population and their "own" regime (even if not everyone supported this regime), while the concept of occupied society focuses on interactions between the local population and the foreign occupying power.58
The concept of occupation society, as developed here, also takes up the postulate of not reducing the history of Jewish people to a passive history of suffering, but rather of integrating it into wider events59, since Jews were also members of the occupied societies until they were murdered or interned in camps without external contact. Their options for action were undoubtedly enormously restricted by the transformation processes which accompanied the occupation, but survival would not have been possible without their own agency and action, particularly under these conditions.
Compared to the majority of peacetime societies, occupied societies are also characterised by marked differences in their gender and generational composition: Men, especially those of military age, were conscripted, at the front, killed in action, prisoners of war or compelled to conduct forced labour. The societies still “at home” therefore consisted of a higher percentage of women60, children, young people and old people than in peacetime61. These groups should therefore also be analysed as central actors in occupied societies.
When it was mentioned above that the actions and behaviour of people in an occupied country were often "occupier-driven", the driving force that comes to mind is the violence used by the occupiers. According to Dieter Pohl, German occupation "changed the face of Europe"62. What is obvious for large areas of eastern and south-eastern Europe also applies, albeit with some reservations, to many other areas of occupation, as the high number of civilian victims shows: it also exceeds the number of military victims in Greece, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway.63
Moreover, occupation violence was not limited to killing. Everyday life under German occupation was also marked by all kinds of assaults, involving injuries, threats, humiliation and demonstrations of armed superiority. Furthermore, experiences at the workplace could be as threatening as humiliating - as work took on an increasingly coercive character in many places - or the experience of being hierarchised according to the racist and utilitarian ideas of the occupiers was also felt, as reflected, for example, in staggered allocations of food and heating materials.64
According to Doris Bergen, in view of the violence of the occupiers, there was "no option of non-involvement"65. The ongoing existential threat to familiar living conditions therefore usually constituted a crisis66 for those affected: Assumptions of what was normal were increasingly questioned, behavioural expectations and routines became uncertain, what had previously been reliable corroded, and the feeling of being deprived of rights and protections rapidly spread. Occupied societies thus turn out to be societies whose order is massively threatened and which are thus under considerable stress.67 Like other societies under conditions of violence, they seem to disintegrate group, as if the rules of social action prescribed by mores, customs and regulations were suspended. In fact, however, trust and mistrust are rearranged, representing, according to Jan Philipp Reemtsma, "strategies of coming to terms with the unclear"68.
For occupation societies, it is important, therefore - with a differentiated perspective of their various groups - to reflect further on the effects of the anxious experience of the threat and use of violence and to enquire into these strategies of (attempting to) come to terms with the unclear, since this represents a central task of the members of occupation societies in everyday life. In these attempts, social relationships, especially family and kinship, play a prominent role.69 Mutual ties and obligations, secured by conventions, made family solidarity, in particular, a "mutual insurance in times of need"70. However, this did not function as an abstract norm, but had to be lived – both before the emergency situation occurred as well as during it. This provided not only the basis for the makeshift economy in deprived areas or for efforts to hide sons with relatives in order to prevent them from being sent to work in the Reich, but it was also reflected in the composition of bunkers in which Jews hoped to survive.71 Family-based strategies of (attempting to) find some sort of security in an uncertain world could also look like this: of several adult sons, one would join the local police force, while his brother joined the resistance72, meaning that a form of contact existed between the various camps.
Under occupation, face-to-face relationships such as those with family and relatives were all the more important because supra-regional relationships were rendered more difficult by the restrictions on mobility imposed by the occupiers, and because the occupied states were limited in the extent to which they could take care of the interests of their citizens. The restriction of the welfare state, which was in any case developed to varying degrees, once again forced the members of occupied societies to turn to the solidarity structures offered by family and neighbours, especially since support benefits, for example for the unemployed, could only be received by registering with the labour offices, which could in turn result in being sent to work in the Reich.73 Family-based strategies of survival and attempts to achieve security through the solidarity of relatives were therefore at the heart of many new arrangements of trust and mistrust, fed by the hope that the family could generate a sense of belonging and a minimum of social reliability, even in crisis situations.
The extent to which these strategies, which were based on (idealised) assumptions of normality, proved to work in occupation societies which were under massive strain is something that further research will have to consider in more detail. However, we know from Holocaust studies that (young) children and their mothers had the worst chances of survival, with parents, and apparently mothers in particular, often finding themselves faced with irresolvable dilemmas, that is, choiceless choices74.
Further close social relationships also included relations with neighbours. Not only in rural regions, but also among the less well-off in the urban environment, informal structures often developed at a neighbourhood level, with a clear obligation to provide mutual support.75 Their role in the context of occupation societies, placed under enormous social pressures, has yet to be investigated in any great detail, particularly for Western and Northern Europe. The only initial findings available to us are taken from Holocaust research on occupied Poland and the occupied western territories of the Soviet Union, and here it becomes apparent that the Jewish population, particularly in rural regions, often came to the bitter realisation that they had been excluded from neighbourly relations following the occupation. While, in recent years, the assistance provided has increasingly been taken into account76, for a long time it was not recognised that "hiding" and "denunciation" could also represent successive forms of dealing with persecuted Jewish persons. In fact, it is now well documented that Jews were not infrequently betrayed, denounced and murdered by their neighbours. Survivors' accounts therefore speak of the great fear they had of their neighbours, which was often greater than their fear of "the Germans", since the latter rarely came to remote villages and could not distinguish Jews from non-Jews without local assistance.77 However, the murderous campaigns of summer 1942, at the latest, made very clear to the local populations that "the Germans" were masters of life and death, and that Jewish life no longer had any value.78
This "insight" had enormous consequences, as demonstrated by studies on rural occupation areas: Locals also participated in the hunt for hidden Jews set in motion by the occupiers, and this in turn also caused fear among those who hid Jews since, time and again, entire families were murdered by the villagers, along with those they had sheltered. Sometimes such incidents were the trigger for further tragedies, when farmers who had been hiding Jews feared so much for their own safety that they themselves killed those whom they had sometimes sheltered for months.79
A multitude of such episodes indicates that, according to the logic of the village, hiding Jews was partly understood as taking an unfair advantage in the redistribution of Jewish property. This was all the more reprehensible in the eyes of village communities because, in the event of discovery, the entire village could be affected, i.e. those as well who had not profited from hiding Jews. By contrast, empathy with the persecuted, which was substantiated as help, was apparently rather rarely part of the communicatively generated village consensus.80 In other words: In village logics, hiding often meant a "privatisation" of the "benefit", while the possibly catastrophic consequences had to be borne by the whole community. This therefore violated the norms of group behaviour established under occupation. Those who did not comply with these ran the risk of turning the village community against them, and this could extend to the use of violence.81
The episodes underlying the logics outlined above shed light on what life under occupation meant, since they clearly illustrate the enormous strain which members of occupation societies were placed under. The findings taken from the context of research on the Shoah point to more general social mechanisms and draw attention to the vulnerability82 of certain groups in the occupied societies. They also make clear that the arrangements of trust and mistrust found in each case always remained precarious - not least because the localscould not control occupation policies but, for some, the occupation opened up new options. Enrichment through the acquisition of Jewish property was an essential part of this, and thus it seems reasonable to examine anti-Semitism as a set of practices.83 What speaks for this, and this applies beyond the context of persecution, is that, from a socio-psychological point of view, people seek to orient their actions to social settings and valid social norms, so that they can understand them as appropriate and meaningful in the situation.84 However, not every case in which people placed themselves in danger was perceived as unreasonable in the situation, as is shown by the examples of women and children in the territory of the occupied Soviet Union who, in the vicinity of the large POW camps, sought to help feed imprisoned Red Army soldiers threatened with starvation. This was apparently based on the conviction that, if women behaved in this way throughout the occupied Soviet Union, their own husbands, fathers or brothers would also have a chance of returning home.85
The differences in the treatment of differing groups of people in need of help requires further research. A more precise understanding of this phenomenon could be gained from the observation that members of the group are treated more positively the more explicitly the boundaries are drawn vis-à-vis non-members. As a consequence of this mechanism, the latter thus have less chance of securing empathy and help.86 Investigations of village communities confirm that those demarcations which the occupiers drew in an extremely brutal manner between "Jews" and "non-Jews" (and elsewhere also between "Germans" and "non-Germans") where confirmed in these societies. In comparing occupation societies in Western and Eastern Europe, one could therefore ask whether, in view of the differing levels and forms of violence, the drawing up or confirmation of group boundaries, for example through village communities, also differed across the continent.
Two further aspects need to be considered in this context: The likelihood of developing feelings of empathy for others, out of which solidary behaviour can grow, depends on their perceived characteristics.87 Traditional anti-Judaism and violent anti-Semitism however rarely gave rise to empathy and a desire to help persecuted Jewish neighbours. The self-perception of village populations as "poor", along with the simultaneous stereotyping of Jews as "rich", also contributed to the fact that villagers, mostly under the guidance or with the approval of local elites88, rather demonstrated solidarity against the persecuted. In this context, social psychologists speak of relative deprivation, based on perceived injustices, and understand this to mean a feeling of dissatisfaction triggered by the belief that one is doing badly compared to others. These feelings are particularly pronounced when the desired aim is close, but the last step to achieving it seems blocked, thus triggering an even greater degree of anger the closer the goal supposedly is.89 This logic must be taken into account with regard to the enrichment gained through the acquisition of Jewish property. It also reinforces the importance of giving a higher research priority to the emotional character of occupation societies and their effects on concrete actions.
The aim of this article is to outline occupation as a specific context of experience, with specific forms of behaviour and strategies of survival under the conditions of violence. The areas of research which emerge from this include the investigation of attempts to come to terms with the unclear through recourse to family networks and other solidarity structures or the examination of the behavioural options which, under the conditions of occupation, appeared situationally appropriate to the local actors. This also includes an exploration of the emotions underpinning such behaviour, as well as of the fact that the consequences of actions may have been unforeseeable, which is essential for an understanding of occupation societies and cannot be restricted to Eastern Europe, which constitutes the current focus of this research.
Among the desiderata in the study of occupation societies are not only the effects on social relations, including the handling of experiences of violence, but also horizons of orientation, ways of speaking and rules governing what could be said under occupation. On the one hand, it must be borne in mind that the disempowerment of statehood brought about by occupation was often accompanied by the formation of hybrid state structures, which found its expression in the rise of local functionaries who were now subject to German leadership. Although it is known that the number of such local officials was in the hundreds of thousands, there continues to be a lack of studies focusing on practices that ask what behavioural options these institutions of hybrid statehood opened up for members of occupying societies and what horizons of orientation were reflected in them. In turn, rules governing “what could be said” also found their expression in rumours, which can be interpreted as a struggle "for the right language for what is to come"90, and in denunciations, which represent a specific form of participation in occupation rule. Overall, the role of those actors involved in both local and supra-regional sense-making, and their interpretation, is beginning to be investigated, and this includes the role of churches and religious communities as well as organisations of national unity.
Conclusion
In the term “occupied society”, the considerations above formulate and provide a conceptual proposition. To this end, they take the fruitful ongoing research on the Second World War and mass crimes as a starting point, in order to contribute to a systematisation of the dimensions of experience associated with occupation and to open these up to a European comparison.
The core of the term occupation society is that it understands occupation as a form of war-induced foreign rule that is associated with the physical and/or regulatory presence of the occupiers, meaning that members of occupation societies are often "occupier-driven" in their actions and forms of behaviour. Occupation also entails the disempowerment of statehood, which often results in the emergence of hybrid state structures. Questions about the relationship between locality and statehood, including the behavioural options that the institutions of hybrid statehood opened up for members of the occupied societies, have yet to be properly discussed.
With regard to the actors, this concept indicates a stronger gender and generational sensitivity, since occupied societies differed from peacetime societies in that, due to the absence of many men as a result of the war, those present at the local level consisted to a much higher degree of women, children, the young and the elderly. Their possibilities for action and patterns of behavior, survival strategies and assumptions of normality, consensus-building and the rules governing what could be said, horizons of orientation as well as the agencies that mediated these (supra-regionally), all make up a central research interest which extends beyond the narrower context of German mass crimes.
In all of this, regional differences in occupation structures play an important role, as does the precise location in the chronology of the war. Overall, however, it is clear that occupation confronted members of the occupied societies with a variety of options, ranging from experiencing repression and persecution to opportunities for enrichment and social advancement. This demonstrates that occupation – though man-made, but in this regard like natural disasters – helps us have a closer look on assumptions about normality, on which the functioning of societies is based,91 since they appear as "the ordinary" within the extraordinary situation of war and occupation92. In a European perspective, the concept of the occupied society aims to contribute to unlocking this everyday life in the extraordinary.
Translation: Francis Ipgrave
* This text is an updated translation of: Tatjana Tönsmeyer, Besatzungsgesellschaften. Begriffliche und konzeptionelle Überlegungen zur Erfahrungsgeschichte des Alltags unter deutscher Besatzung im Zweiten Weltkrieg; first published as Version: 1.0, in: Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, 18.12.2015, URL: http://docupedia.de/zg/Besatzungsgesellschaften.
1 Tony Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945, London 2005, p. 16ff. Victim accounts have also been presented by Alex Kay, Empire of Destruction. A History of Nazi Mass Killing, New Haven/London 2021 and Dieter Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Verbrechen 1939-1945, Stuttgart 2022.
2 Marc Buggeln/Michael Wildt (eds.), Arbeit im Nationalsozialismus, Munich 2014, herein especially Marc Buggeln, Unfreie Arbeit im Nationalsozialismus Begrifflichkeiten und Vergleichsaspekte zu den Arbeitsbedingungen im Deutschen Reich und in den besetzten Gebieten, pp. 231-252, p. 243. 231-252, p. 243. Dieter Pohl/Tanja Sebta (eds.), Zwangsarbeit in Hitlers Europa - Besatzung, Arbeit, Folgen, Berlin 2013; Karsten Linne/Florian Dierl (eds.), Arbeitskräfte als Kriegsbeute. Der Fall Ost- und Südosteuropa 1939-1945, Berlin 2011.
3 Tatjana Tönsmeyer, Hungerökonomien. Zum Umgang mit der Mangelversorgung im besetzten Europa des Zweiten Weltkrieges, in: Historische Zeitschrift 301 (2015), pp. 662-704.
4 Tim Schanetzky, "Kanonen statt Butter". Wirtschaft und Konsum im Dritten Reich, Munich 2015. In an older account, Dieter Pohl cites the figure of 200 million. See Dieter Pohl, Herrscher und Unterworfene. Die deutsche Besatzung und die Gesellschaften Europas, in: Dietmar Süß/Winfried Süß (eds.), Das "Dritte Reich". Eine Einführung, Munich 2008, pp. 267-285, p. 276. Summarising recent perpetrator research: Frank Bajohr, Neuere Täterforschung, Version: 1.0, in: Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, 18.6.2013, http://docupedia.de/zg/Neuere_Taeterforschung?oldid=106458.
5 The exhibition "Mythen der Nationen. 1945 – Arena der Erinnerungen“ (Myths of Nations. 1945 - Arena of Memories) at the German Historical Museum in 2004/5 extended this finding to the formerly occupied countries in its national variations. Etienne François, Meistererzählungen und Dammbrüche. Die Erinnerung an den Zweiten Weltkrieg zwischen Nationalisierung und Universalisierung, in: Monika Flacke (ed.), Mythen der Nationen. 1945 - Arena der Erinnerungen, Berlin 2004, pp. 13-28, esp. p. 15f.
6 Pieter Lagrou, The Legacy of Nazi Occupation. Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in Western Europe, 1945-1965, Cambridge 2000, p. 35.
7 Matthias Waechter, Der Mythos des Gaullismus. Heldenkult, Geschichtspolitik und Ideologie 1940-1958, Göttingen 2006. On the resistance myth cultivated by the PCF in the 1950s, in which de Gaulle was branded a "fascist" or a "pioneer of fascism", see Serge Berstein, Le PCF et de Gaulles sous la IVème Républic, in: Stéphane Courtois/Marc Lazar (eds.), 50 ans d'une passion française. De Gaulle et les communistes, Paris 1991, pp. 197-215.
8 Maud Anne Bracke, From Politics to Nostalgia. The Transformation of War Memories in France during the 1960s-1970s, in: European History Quarterly 41 (2011), H. 1, pp. 5-24; Henry Rousso, Le syndrome de Vichy 1944-198 ..., Paris 1987. On the ensuing debate, see, France and the "Dark Years". Das Regime von Vichy in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Göttingen 2010.
9 Martin Conway, The End(s) of Memory. Memories of the Second World War in Belgium, in: Journal of Belgian History 42 (2012), pp. 170-187, p. 173 and p. 176.
10 Christoph Strupp, Niederlande - Entwicklungen und Tendenzen der zeithistorischen Forschung, Version: 1.0, in: Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, 22.3.2011, http://docupedia.de/zg/Niederlande_-_Entwicklungen_und_Tendenzen_der_zeithistorischen_Forschung?oldid=97428; see also Krijn Thijs, Niederlande - Schwarz, Weiß, Grau. Zeithistorische Debatten seit 2000, Version: 1.0, in: Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, 3.6.2011, http://docupedia.de/zg/Niederlande_-_Schwarz_Weiss_Grau?oldid=106461.
11 Ellen Tops, Niederlande – Lebendige Vergangenheit, in: Flacke, Mythen, pp. 427-452, p. 429 and p. 433ff.
12 A recent summary of this can be found in Imke Hansen, Sowjetische und postsowjetische Repräsentationen des Zweiten Weltkrieges, in: Babette Quinkert/Jörg Morré (eds.), Deutsche Besatzung in der Sowjetunion 1941-1944. Vernichtungskrieg, Reaktionen, Erinnerung, Paderborn 2014, pp. 299-317.
13 See, among others, Juliane Fürst, Die Ukraine, Putin und die Rhetorik des Krieges. https://geschichtedergegenwart.ch/die-ukraine-putin-und-die-rhetorik-des-krieges/ [last accessed 19.12.2022]. See also Georgiy Kasianov, Von Geschichte besessen. Putins (selbst)zerstörerische Geschichtspolitik im Krieg gegen die Ukraine. https://geschichtedergegenwart.ch/von-geschichte-besessen-putins-selbstzerstoererische-geschichtspolitik-im-krieg-gegen-die-ukraine/ [last accessed 19.12.2022].
14 On the Warsaw Uprising Museum, which opened in 2004, see Monika Heinemann, Das
Museum des Warschauer Aufstands, in: Zeitgeschichte-online, July 2014, http://www.zeitgeschichte-online.de/geschichtskultur/das-museum-des-warschauer-aufstands.
15 Włodzimierz Borodziej, Der Warschauer Aufstand 1944, Frankfurt a.M. 2004, pp. 126-139; Beate Kosmala, Polen - Lange Schatten der Erinnerung: Der Zweite Weltkrieg im kollektiven Gedächtnis, in: Flacke, Mythen, pp. 509-530. On the changed perception of Auschwitz, see Marek Kucia, Auschwitz in der öffentlichen Meinung Polens, in: Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 11 (2002), pp. 198-216, and on the debate on Polish-Jewish relations Barbara Engelking/Helga Hirsch (eds.), Unbequeme Wahrheiten. Polen und sein Verhältnis zu den Juden, Frankfurt a.M. 2008.
16 Tatjana Tönsmeyer, Slowakei - Erfahrung und Erinnerung, in: Flacke, Mythen, pp. 799-812; idem., Vom "Recht auf die eigene Geschichte" - Der Slowakische Staat 1939 bis 1945 in der Historiographie, in: Bohemia 44 (2003), H. 2, pp. 356-369.
17 Daniel Levy/Natan Sznaider (eds.), Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter - Der Holocaust, Frankfurt a.M. 2001.
18 The term goes back to the French head of state Philippe Pétain, who announced on the radio on 11 October 1940: "Now, after its victory, Germany can [offer] us a new peace based on collaboration." Quoted from Marc Olivier Baruch, Das Vichy-Regime. France 1940-1944, Stuttgart 1999, p. 75.
19 Tanja Penter, Collaboration on Trial: New Source Material on Soviet Postwar Trials against Collaborators, in: Slavic Review 64 (2005), H. 4, pp. 780-790; this, Local Collaborators on Trial. Soviet War Crimes Trials under Stalin (1943-1953), in: Cahiers du Monde russe 49 (2008), pp. 2-3, 341-364.
20 After the occupation of Norway, Vidkun Quisling was initially chairman of the governing administrative council and, from 1942 to 1945, as chairman of the Nazi-inspired Norwegian fascist party Nasjonal Samling, he was prime minister of a government which cooperated closely with the occupying power. He was arrested on 9 May 1945 and executed on 24 October 1945 following a trial for treason. In the post-war period, his name was considered synonymous with traitors and collaborators.
21 See, for example, István Deák/Jan T. Gross/Tony Judt (eds.), The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and its Aftermath, Princeton 2000. Research in this area has continued to develop, not least in the field of transitional justice. See Jon Elster (ed.), Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy, New York 2006.
22 As an example: Fabrice Virgili, Shorn Women. Gender and Punishment in Liberation France, Oxford 2002.
23 Luc Huyse, The Criminal Justice System as a Political Actor in Regime Transitions. The Case of Belgium, 1944-1950, in: Deák/Gross/Judt, Politics, pp. 157-172, on Belgium (where disfranchisement disproportionately affected Catholics and thus benefited left-wing parties); Benjamin Frommer, National Cleansing. Retribution against Nazi Collaboration in Postwar Czechoslovakia, Cambridge 2005, pp. 192-222, who shows that "offences against national honour" in Czechoslovakia retroactively criminalised interethnic contacts.
24 This can be seen, for example, in the treatment of less exposed members of the administration or the so-called economic collaboration, whose sentences were largely fairly lenient, so as not to hinder reconstruction.
25 In view of the inadequate preparation, the poor implementation and the priority of removing industrial capacities in particular, cadres who should have been evacuated were left behind almost everywhere on the territory of the occupied Soviet Union. Rebecca Manley, To the Tashkent Station. Evacuation and Survival in the Soviet Union at War, Ithaca 2009.
26 Jeffrey W. Jones, "Every Family Has its Freak." Perceptions of Collaboration in Occupied Soviet Russia, 1943-1948, in: Slavic Review 64 (2005), H. 4, pp. 747-770.
27 Konstantin Simonov, Sofia Leonidovna, Berlin (East) 1989, p. 11.
28 Ibid, p. 25.
29 Michael Marrus, The Holocaust in History, London 1987, pp. 156-183. See also id. (ed.), The Nazi Holocaust. Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews, Part 8: Bystanders to the Holocaust, Berlin 1989; Raul Hilberg, Täter, Opfer, Zuschauer. Die Vernichtung der Juden 1933-1945, Frankfurt a.M. 1997, pp. 215-293.
30 The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum paradigmatically states: "[O]ne of the Holocaust's fundamental lessons is that to be a bystander is to share the guilt [...]. Only the intervention of the bystander can help society to become more humane." Quoted from Donald Bloxham/Tony Kushner, The Holocaust. Critical Historical Approaches, Manchester/New York 2005, p. 176. On the increasingly critical reflections on the term, see also Christina Morina/Krijn Thijs (eds.): Probing the Limits of Categorization. The Bystander in Holocaust History, New York/Oxford 2018.
31 Jan T. Gross, Neighbors. The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland, Princeton 2001.
32 See also, among others, Barbara Engelking, Jest taki pie̜kny słoneczny dzień. Losy Żydów szukaja̜ cych ratunku na wsi polskiej 1942-1945, Warszawa 2011 (also: Idem. Such a beautiful sunny day. Jews seeking refuge in the Polish countryside, 1942-1945, Jerusalem 2016). Jan Tomasz Gross/Irena Grudzińska Gross, Golden Harvest. Events at the Periphery of the Holocaust, Oxford 2012. Jan Grabowski, Hunt for the Jews. Betrayal and Murder in German-Occupied Poland, Bloomington 2013. Barbara Engelking/Jan Grabowski (eds.): Dalej jest noc. Losy Żydów w wybranych powiatach okupowanej Polski, Warszawa 2018 (also: Idem., Night without End. The Fate of Jews in German-occupied Poland, Bloomington/Indiana 2022). Omer Bartov: Anatomy of Genocide. The Life and Death of a Town called Buczacz, New York 2018. Tomasz Frydel: Judenjagd: Reassessing the role of ordinary Poles as perpetrators in the Holocaust; in: Timothy Williams/Susanne Buckley-Zistel (eds.), Perpetrators and Perpetration of Mass Violence. Action, Motivations and Dynamics, London / New York 2018, pp. 187-203. Agnieszka Wierzcholska: Nur Erinnerungen und Steine sind geblieben Leben und Sterben einer polnisch-jüdischen Stadt: Tarnów 1918-1945, Paderborn 2022.
33 Mark Levene, The Crisis of Genocide, Oxford 2013 (2 vols.); Omer Bartov/Eric D. Weitz (eds.), Shatterzone of Empires. Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands, Indiana University Press 2013; Christian Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies. Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World, Cambridge 2010; Alexander V. Prusin, Conflict in the East European Borderlands, 1870-1992, Oxford 2010; Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin, Munich 2010.
34 Michaela Christ, Die Dynamik des Tötens. Die Ermordung der Juden von Berditschew, Ukraine 1941-44, Frankfurt a.M. 2011, p. 125. Wierzcholska, Erinnerungen, p. 361.
35 Eric C. Steinhart, Family, Fascists, and "Volksdeutsche": The Bogdanovka Collective Farm and the Holocaust in Southern Ukraine, December 1941, in: Holocaust Studies: A Journal of Culture and History 16 (2010), pp. 1-2, 65-96. Steinhart uses the example of a collective farm in southern Ukraine, to which two villages belonged, one inhabited predominantly by Ukrainians, the other Volksdeutsch, to show that Sonderkommando R of Einsatzgruppe D, which operated in this area, did not determine Volksdeutsch affiliation itself, but left this to a Volksdeutsch “clan chief” who appeared trustworthy. He mainly defined his relatives as "ethnic Germans", meaning that, as a result of interethnic marriages, several Ukrainians and Russians could be found among them. The advantages mentioned above were connected with this affiliation, so that even later, after the militia had been formed and used as an auxiliary force of the SK R during mass shootings, it was not questioned, especially since the "distribution of booty" after such "actions" was also carried out along racial hierarchies: After the SS men, the "ethnic German" militiamen received high-quality clothing. Remaining pieces were distributed among the Ukrainians from a second village who had stood guard.
36 Omer Bartov, Communal Genocide. Personal Accounts of the Destruction of Buczacz, Eastern Galicia, 1941-1944, in: Bartov/Weitz, Shatterzone, pp. 399-420, p. 400.
37 Mark Roseman, Bloodlines. Review Forum on Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin, in: Journal of Genocide Research 13 (2011), H. 3, pp. 320-326, p. 322. See also in part Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews 1939-1945. The Years of Extermination, New York 2007.
38 Doris Bergen, What do Studies of Women, Gender, and Sexuality Contribute to Understanding the Holocaust, in: Myrna Goldenberg/Amy Shapiro (eds.), Different Horrors, Same Hell. Gender and the Holocaust, Washington 2013, pp. 16-37, p. 21ff.
39 See e.g. Christ, Dynamik, p. 111f.
40 Tatjana Tönsmeyer: Kriegstrennungen und Familienzerstörungen. Von abwesenden Männern, weiblichen Haushaltsvorständen, verlassenen Kindern und dem außeralltäglichen Alltag europäischer Besatzungsgesellschaften, 1939-1945; in: Familientrennungen im nationalsozialistischen Krieg. Erfahrungen und Praktiken in Deutschland und im besetzten Europa 1939-1945, ed. by Wiebke Lisner, Johannes Hürter, Cornelia Rauh and Lu Segers, Göttingen 2022, pp. 35-56. See as well the special issue on Housing, Hiding and the Holocaust as volume 20/2022 of the Journal of Modern European History.
41 Patrick Desbois, The Holocaust by Bullets. A Priest's Journey to Uncover the Truth behind the Murder of 1.5 Million Jews, New York 2008, p. 74; further statements of this kind can be found throughout the text. Even when Desbois notes examples of enrichment, he does not present them as active acts, but writes "They found things, they even found American dollars (!)" (p. 40), "they received things" (p. 109) or "Jews [...] were throwing away last possessions - necklaces, wedding rings, and the few bits of jewellery they had left - so as not to leave them to the Germans" (p. 74). These and other quotations can be read as adopted meanings of actors in local societies.
42 Svenja Goltermann, Opfer. Die Wahrnehmung von Krieg und Gewalt in der Moderne, Frankfurt am Main 2017.
43 Judt, Postwar, p. 13.
44 Militärhistorisches Forschungsamt (ed.), Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Stuttgart 1979-2008 (10 vols.); Czesław Madajczyk, Faszyzm i okupacje, 1938-1945. Wykonywanie okupacji przez państwa Osi w Europie, Poznań 1983-1984 (2 vols.); Werner Röhr (ed.), Europa unterm Hakenkreuz, Berlin 1994-1996 (2 vols.); Wolfgang Benz/Johannes Houwink ten Cate/Gerhard Otto (eds.), Nationalsozialistische Besatzungspolitik in Europa 1939-1945, Berlin 1996-2001 (10 vols.).
45 In contrast to the concept of occupation under international law, the core of which is described in the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare as the cessation of hostilities, the typical real-life forms of occupation during the Second World War include both those that led to armistice agreements (as in France) and the occupation of territories in which hostilities continued (as in the Soviet Union).
46 Stephan Leibfried/Michael Zürn, Von der nationalen zur post-nationalen Konstellation, in: dies. (eds.), T Transformationen des Staates? Frankfurt a.M. 2006, pp. 19-65, p. 47. During the Second World War, such "disenfranchisement" took different forms, depending on the occupying administration.
47 István Deák attributes the coining of the term "occupier-driven" to Jan Gross. István Deák, Introduction, in: Deák/Gross/Judt, Politics, pp. 3-14, p. 6.
48 Robert Traba, Warum Besatzung? Reflexionen über die deutsch-polnische Geschichte, in: Historie. Jahrbuch des Zentrums für Historische Forschung Berlin der Polnischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 7/2013-14, pp. 7-26, p. 11.
49 See, for example, Gert C. Lübbers, Die 6. Armee und die Zivilbevölkerung von Stalingrad, in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 54 (2006) No. 1, pp. 87-123, p. 100, or Tomasz Szarota, Warschau unter dem Hakenkreuz, Paderborn 1985, p. 121.
50 For recent examples, see Franziska Exeler, Ghosts of War. Nazi Occupation and Its Aftermath in Soviet Belarus, Ithaca 2022 or Johannes Due Enstad, Soviet Russians under Nazi Occupation. Fragile Loyalties in World War II, Cambridge 2018.
51 Karel Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair. Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule, Cambridge/Mass. 2004, pp. 164-186; Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler's Greece. The Experience of Occupation, 1941-1944, New Haven/London 1993, pp. 56-61; Richard Vinen, The Unfree French. Life under the Occupation, London 2006, pp. 219-223.
52 See the comprehensive source edition Fighting Hunger, Dealing with Shortage. Everyday Life under Occupation in World War II Europe; ed. by Tatjana Tönsmeyer, Peter Haslinger, Włodzimierz Borodziej, Stefan Martens and Irina Sherbakova, Leiden/Boston 2021, 2 vols. and Coping with Hunger and Shortage under German Occupation, ed. by Tatjana Tönsmeyer, Peter Haslinger and Agnes Laba, Cham 2018.
53 Tönsmeyer, Hungerökonomien, p. 671ff.
54 Traba, Warum Besatzung? p. 11.
55 Reinhart Koselleck, Erfahrungsraum und Erwartungshorizont. Zwei historische Kategorien, in: ders. (ed.), Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten, Frankfurt a.M. 1989, pp. 349-375, online at https://www.istitutosvizzero.it/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ISR_StudioRoma_Koselleck_DE1.pdf; Nikolaus Buschmann/Horst Carl (eds.), Die Erfahrung des Krieges. Erfahrungsgeschichtliche Perspektiven von der Französischen Revolution bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg, Paderborn 2001; Michel De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, Berkeley 1984.
56 Dietmar Süß, Tod aus der Luft. Kriegsgesellschaft und Luftkrieg in Deutschland und England, Munich 2011, p. 16.
57 Jörg Echternkamp, Im Kampf an der inneren und äußeren Front. Grundzüge der deutschen Gesellschaft im Zweiten Weltkrieg, in: idem. (commissioned by the Military History Research Office), Die deutsche Kriegsgesellschaft 1939-1945, Munich 2004, pp. 1-93, pp. 2ff. and fundamentally Süß, Tod. On the communities of memory resulting from the experience after the end of the war, e.g. Neil Gregor, Haunted City Nuremberg and the Nazi Past, New Haven 2008 or Malte Thießen, Eingebrannt ins Gedächtnis. Hamburgs Gedenken an Luftkrieg und Kriegsende 1943 bis 2005, Munich 2007. With regard to the First World War see Christoph Nübel, Die Mobilisierung der Kriegsgesellschaft, Propaganda und Alltag im Ersten Weltkrieg in Münster, Münster 2006 or Ute Daniel, Arbeiterfrauen in der Kriegsgesellschaft. Beruf, Familie und Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg, Göttingen 1989.
58 Depending on the course of the war, the society of a state can therefore also be divided into a wartime and an occupied society, as was the case in the Soviet Union, which can be described as a wartime society in its unoccupied part. However, as a result of the concentration on the National Socialist war of extermination, research in recent years has been directed more towards the occupied territories.
59 On this postulate: Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews 1939-1945. The Years of Extermination, New York 2007.
60 Sexual violence against women has received notable attention in recent years, see most recently Maren Röger, Kriegsbeziehungen. Intimität, Gewalt und Prostitution im besetzten Polen 1939 bis 1945, Frankfurt a.M. 2015.
61 The Protectorate, which had already been established before the start of the war in the course of the break-up of Czechoslovakia, can be considered an exception, in that the male population was largely present.
62 Pohl, Herrscher, p. 282. See also Bernd Weisbrod, Sozialgeschichte und Gewalterfahrung im 20. Jahrhundert, in: Paul Nolte/Manfred Hettling (eds.), Perspektiven der Gesellschaftsgeschichte, Munich 2000, pp. 112-123.
63 Judt, Postwar, p. 18. By contrast, the number of military casualties outweighed the number of civilian casualties in the two wartime societies, Germany and Great Britain. Ibid.
64 Marc Buggeln, Unfreie Arbeit im Nationalsozialismus. Begrifflichkeiten und Vergleichsaspekte zu den Arbeitsbedingungen im Deutschen Reich und in den besetzten Gebieten, in: Buggeln/Wildt, Arbeit, pp. 231-252 and Tönsmeyer, Hungerökonomien.
65 Bergen, What do, p. 23.
66 In recent years, the literature on crises has been growing steadily in the wake of Reinhart Koselleck, Kritik und Krise. Eine Studie zur Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt, Freiburg/München 1959. Among the more recent publications see Thomas Mergel (ed.), Krisen verstehen. Historische und kulturwissenschaftliche Annäherungen, Frankfurt a.M. 2012.
67 Ewald Frie/Mischa Meier, Bedrohte Ordnungen. Gesellschaften unter Stress im Vergleich, in: idem. (eds.), Aufruhr, Katastrophe, Konkurrenz, Zerfall. Bedrohte Ordnungen als Thema der Kulturwissenschaften, Tübingen 2014, pp. 1-27, p. 4.
68 Jan Philipp Reemtsma, Vertrauen und Gewalt. Versuch über eine besondere Konstellation der Moderne, Hamburg 2008, p. 66f.
69 So far, this has been researched more with regard to Jewish survivors of the Holocaust, especially since the topos plays an important role in memories. As one example among many: Boris Zabarko, "Only We Survived". Holocaust in the Ukraine. Zeugnisse und Dokumente, Wittenberg 2004; see in particular the survivor's account by Jelisaweta Brusch, "In the ghetto 106 and at the front 38 of our relatives perished ...", pp. 68-75. See also Tönsmeyer, Kriegstrennungen, pp. 51-55.
70 Gerd Spittler, Handeln in einer Hungerkrise. Das Beispiel der Kel Ewey Tuareg, in: Dominik Collet/Thore Lassen/Ansgar Schanbacher (eds.), Handeln in Hungerkrisen. Neue Perspektiven auf soziale und klimatische Vulnerabilität, Göttingen 2012, pp. 27-44, p. 30.
71 Tönsmeyer, Hungerökonomien; Hein A. M. Klemann, Die niederländische Wirtschaft von 1938 bis 1948 im Griff von Krieg und Besatzung, in: Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2001, pp. 53-76, here p. 71; Natalia Aleksiun, Gender and the Daily Lives of Jews in Hiding in Eastern Galicia, in: NASHIM: A Journal of Jewish Women's Studies and Gender Issues 27 (2014), pp. 38-61.
72 Tanja Penter has pointed out on several occasions that, in view of the existential crises that people in occupied Ukraine experienced, their life stories cannot be understood according to simple categories of good and evil; e.g. Tanja Penter, Die Ukrainer und der "Große Vaterländische Krieg". Die Komplexität der Kriegsbiographien, in: Andreas Kappeler (ed.), Die Ukraine. Prozesse der Nationsbildung Cologne/Vienna 2011, pp. 335-348. This is all the more true when considering entire families (and not only with regard to Ukraine).
73 Klemann, Wirtschaft, p. 67 with a view to the Netherlands. In the occupied eastern territories, on the other hand, the German demand for labour was so great that it could not be met despite the introduction of forced labour. Those who did not report daily to the labour office were subject to draconian penalties and were all the more dependent on aid networks. See, for example, Maryna Dubyk, Arbeitseinsatz und Lebensbedingungen im Reichskommissariat Ukraine und im ukrainischen Gebiet unter Militärverwaltung (1941-1944), in: Pohl/Sebta, Zwangsarbeit, pp. 195-213.
74 On the concept of choiceless choices Lawrence L. Langer, Versions of Survival. The Holocaust and the Human Spirit, Albany 1982, esp. p. 72. On the stigmatisation of decisions arising from choiceless-choices situations, which occurred primarily in parent (young) child constellations, see Christopher Browning, Remembering Survival. Inside a Nazi Slave-Labor Camp. New York 2010, esp. pp. 10, 35, 94, 204 and 298f.
75 Andreas Gestrich/Jens-Uwe Krause/Michael Mitterauer, Geschichte der Familie, Stuttgart 2003, p. 643f.
76 For a German historiography, see e.g. the series "Solidarität und Hilfe. Rettungsversuche für Juden vor der Verfolgung und Vernichtung unter nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft", ed. by Wolfgang Benz and Juliane Wetzel, 7 vols, Berlin 1996-2004.
77 Jan T. Gross, Neighbors. The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland, Princeton 2001; Barbara Engelking, Jest taki pie̜kny słoneczny dzień. Losy Żydów szukaja̜ cych ratunku na wsi polskiej 1942-1945, Warszawa 2011 and Jan Grabowski, Hunt for the Jews. Betrayal and Murder in German-Occupied Poland, Bloomington 2013.
78 Grabowski, Hunt, p. 54.
79 Ibid, p. 153.
80 Ibid, pp. 161-170.
81 In her testimonial, Fela Grün reports that, in December 1943, two policemen appeared on the farm of her rescuers to look for hidden Jews. Since the farmers denied having hidden Jews, they were beaten and the woman was sexually threatened. Grün writes that one of the policemen "tried to rape (or maybe even raped) Sołtys's wife. I could hear very well when she sobbed and asked him to leave her alone, saying that her husband could come at any moment." Quoted from ibid, p. 166.
82 On the concept of vulnerability, which is increasingly used in the context of disaster research in particular, see e.g. Dominik Collet, "Vulnerability" as a bridging concept in hunger research, in: idem./Lassen/Schanbacher, Handeln, pp. 13-26, and Brenda D. Phillips (ed.), Social Vulnerability to Disasters, Boca Raton 2012. For a critical assessment, see Stephen Devereux, Theories of Famine, New York 1993, pp. 66-85.
83 Tim Buchen, Antisemitism in Galicia. Agitation, Violence and Politics against Jews in the Habsburg Monarchy around 1900, Berlin 2012.
84 Based on Harald Welzer, Wer waren die Täter? Anmerkungen zur Täterforschung aus sozialpsychologischer Sicht, in: Gerhard Paul (ed.), Die Täter der Shoah. Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche? Göttingen 2002, pp. 237-253.
85 See e.g. Berkhoff, Harvest, pp. 95-104 and pp. 109f.
86 Hans W. Bierhoff/Beate Küpper, Sozialpsychologie der Solidarität, in: Kurt Bayertz (ed.), Solidarität. Begriff und Problem, Frankfurt a.M. 1998, pp. 263-297, p. 281 and p. 283.
87 Bierhoff/Küpper, Sozialpsychologie, p. 277.
88 Gross/Grudzińska Gross, Harvest, p. 59ff.
89 Bierhoff/Küpper, Sozialpsychologie, p. 278f.
90 Sweet, Death, p. 71.
91 Harald Welzer, Klimakriege. Wofür im 21. Jahrhundert getötet wird, Frankfurt a.M. 2010, p. 43.
92 Marc Elie/Klaus Gestwa, Zwischen Risikogesellschaft und Katastrophenkulturen. Zur Einführung in die Katastrophengeschichte des östlichen Europa, in: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 62 (2014), H. 2, pp. 161-179, p. 161.